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Abstract
Comparativism is the view that comparative beliefs (e.g., believing p to
be more likely than q) are more fundamental than partial beliefs (e.g.,
believing p to some degree x), with the latter explicable as theoretical
constructs designed to facilitate reasoning about patterns within systems
of comparative beliefs that exist under special conditions. In this paper, I
first outline several varieties of comparativism, including two ‘Ramseyan’
varieties which generalise the standard ‘probabilistic’ approaches. I then
provide a general critique that applies to any and all comparativist views.
Ultimately, there are too many things that we ought to be able to say
about partial beliefs that comparativism renders unintelligible. Moreover,
there are alternative ways to account for the measurement of belief that
need not face the same expressive limitations.
1 Introduction
Meet Sally, an ordinary human being, and one of the subjects of this paper. Like
the rest of us, Sally has beliefs, broadly construed: there’s some way she takes
the world to be that’s generally responsive to her evidence and which guides her
intentional behaviour. This paper concerns what Sally’s system of beliefs might
be like at its most fundamental level, and the relationship between different
kinds of beliefs she seems to have. To get the ball rolling, I’ll start by making
some assumptions.
First, I’ll assume that Sally has at least two kinds of belief: partial and
comparative. In the former category, for example, Sally is 100% certain that
dropbears exist, between 95% and 99% confident that there’s one in the trees
above her, quite unsure what will happen if it attacks, but doubtful it’ll be good.
Each of her partial beliefs comes with some (possibly imprecise) strength, which
can (at least sometimes) be described numerically; e.g., ‘99% confident’. And in
the category of her comparative beliefs, Sally is, for instance, just as confident
that dropbears exist as she is that 2 + 2 = 4, she’s more confident that there’s
one in the trees above than that there isn’t, and so on.
Second, and mostly just to keep complications to a minimum, I’m going to
assume that what it is for Sally to have partial and comparative beliefs cannot
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be cashed out in terms of outright beliefs. In fact, I’ll assume that anything
that can be said about Sally’s doxastic state in toto can be said in terms of her
partial and/or comparative beliefs—were I to specify all of her partial beliefs
and all of her comparative beliefs, then I would have said enough to fix all the
facts about her doxastic state, with nothing left over. In describing how Sally
takes the world to be, there’s no need to mention her outright beliefs at all.1
This is the last I’ll speak of outright beliefs in this paper.
Given these two assumptions, it’s natural to wonder about the relationship
between Sally’s partial beliefs and her comparative beliefs. It’s clear enough that
they are connected. For instance, from the fact that Sally has high confidence
that p and low confidence that q, it follows that she’s more confident that p
than she is that q. Likewise, if she’s takes p and q to be equally likely, then she’s
certain that p just in case she’s certain that q. Such inferences have a feel of
apriority about them, and it’s reasonable to think that they’re underwritten by
some interesting metaphysical connection.
An obvious and natural thought is that the facts about Sally’s comparative
beliefs fall out of the facts about the relative strengths of her partial beliefs,
and so partial beliefs are the more fundamental of the two belief states. But
there are other possibilities. In particular, according to one common position,
comparativism, the facts about Sally’s partial beliefs supervene on, and hold in
virtue of, the facts about her comparative beliefs. So, for example, a compara-
tivist might say that Sally’s certain that there are dropbears if and only if, and
because, she considers the proposition dropbears exist to be at least as probable
as any other proposition whatsoever; and she’s 50% confident that there are
hoopsnakes whenever she takes hoopsnakes exist to be exactly as probable as
its negation.2
Comparativism comes in a range of shapes and sizes, with advocates going
back at least as far as deFinetti (1931), Koopman (1940), Fine (1973), Zynda
(2000), and more recently, Hawthorne (2016) and Stefa´nsson (2017, 2018). But,
from the very beginning, it has been centrally motivated by the need to explain
‘where the numbers come from’. As Koopman put it,
... all the axiomatic treatments of intuitive probability current in the
literature take as their starting point a number (usually between 0
and 1) corresponding to the ‘degree of rational belief’... Now we
hold that such a number is in no wise a self-evident concomitant
with or expression of the primordial intuition of probability, but
1 I recognise that not everyone will agree with these assumptions, and that there are im-
portant positions that I am setting to one side. Some may prefer, e.g., the view that Sally’s
partial and comparative beliefs are really just outright beliefs about objective probabilities.
Some may even doubt that partial beliefs exist in any meaningful sense (cf. Horgan 2017). But
a discussion has to start somewhere, and I’m hardly alone in thinking that outright beliefs
can be dispensed with in favour of a more fundamental, and fundamentally graded, doxastic
attitude (e.g., Christensen 2004; Eriksson and Ha´jek 2007; Clarke 2013).
2 I emphasise: comparativism, as I’m understanding it here, is not the view that partial
beliefs supervene on some comparative thing or other. It is specifically about the relationship
between partial and comparative beliefs. Comparativism can be—and often is—divorced from
the thesis that our doxastic states depend on our preferences, and the reader should be careful
to keep these ideas separate for what follows. Of course, one could be a comparativist and
also think that comparative beliefs supervene in turn on preferences (e.g., Savage 1954), but
comparativists in general aren’t committed to this. Likewise, if you think partial beliefs su-
pervene on comparative beliefs in combination with preferences, or anything else, then you’re
not a comparativist for my purposes—though see §5.1 for discussion.
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rather a mathematical construct derived from [comparative beliefs]
under very special conditions... (1940, p. 269)
Koopman is right about this at least: the numbers we use to refer to and reason
about strengths of beliefs are not essential to them. They belong merely to a
conventional system for the representation and measurement of some psycho-
logical phenomena which must be fundamentally qualitative in nature. As such,
anyone who wants to explain what partial beliefs are has to be able to say, in
purely qualitative terms, just what the strength of belief is a measure of, and
why we’re justified in measuring it as we do. A primary driving force behind
comparativism is its promise to do just this.
However, I don’t think comparativists have correctly identified the actual
qualitative phenomena that explain the strengths of our partial beliefs. In the
sequel, I’ll argue that comparativism requires too radical a departure from our
ordinary understanding of partial belief, and that it’s unable to adequately ac-
commodate the full range of commitments implicit in our partial belief discourse.
There’s too many things we ought to be able to say that comparativism ren-
ders meaningless, and we’ve yet to be given plausible independent reasons for
thinking that they should be considered meaningless.
The paper proceeds as follows. In §2, I will outline the ‘standard’ compar-
ativist explanation for how partial beliefs can be measured. §3 is expository: I
discuss four varieties of comparativism, and show how they all purport to ex-
plain the measurement of partial belief using essentially the same idea. Then,
in §4, I argue that the explanation is misguided, and (moreover) that there are
still some things we should like to say about partial beliefs that comparativism,
in general, cannot accommodate. §5 deals with several objections, and in §6, I
argue that despite recent defences, comparativists still lack an adequate account
of how we make interpersonal comparisons.
Ultimately, though, comparativism can only be considered relative to its
rivals. After all, it may be that the best alternatives to comparativism suffer
from the same—or worse!—expressive limitations, or otherwise fail to offer a
satisfying an account of what our beliefs are like. Consequently, in §7, I conclude
the discussion with a sketch of an alternative non-comparativist account of
the measurement of belief—one with richer expressive resources and a natural
explanation of interpersonal comparisons.
2 Comparativist Explanations of Cardinality
It’s usually taken for granted that numerical strengths of belief encode more-
than-merely-ordinal (a.k.a. cardinal) information. For instance, we’re generally
happy to say that Sally can believe one proposition p much more than she
believes q. Likewise, and stronger, most would take the following as valid:
1. Sally believes p to degree x
2. Sally believes q to degree y
∴ If x = n·y, then Sally believes p n times as much as q
And in the other direction (from cardinal comparisons to absolute degrees):
1. Sally believes p n times as much as q
∴ If Sally believes p to degree y, then she believes q to degree x = n·y
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These facts mark a widespread commitment to idea that strengths of belief
can be measured on a ratio scale, or at least something much like it. Such
commitments need to be explained, or explained away, by any adequate account
of what partial beliefs are.
Comparativists have a standard strategy for explaining how partial beliefs
can be measured on a ratio scale. The basic idea goes at least as far back
as (deFinetti 1931). It’s discussed in numerous locations, though in particular
depth by Fine (1973, pp. 68ff) and Stefa´nsson (2017, 2018). As Krantz et al.
put it, the strategy is ‘to treat the assignment of [subjective] probabilities as a
measurement problem of the same fundamental character as the measurement
of, e.g., mass or [length]’ (1971, p. 200). As such, I’ll begin by showing how it’s
possible to construct a ratio scale for the measurement of length from a system
of purely ordinal length comparisons.
Let α and β be two concrete objects, and compare:
O. α is longer than β
R. α is twice as long as β
R obviously contains strictly more information than O, which suggests a puzzle:
how can the extra cardinal information in R be explained merely by reference
to a system of weaker ordinal comparisons like O? Well, note that R holds true
(roughly) iff, if you were to take two disjoint objects each as long as β (call them
β1 and β2, β’s duplicates) and join them end-to-end, the resulting object would
be as long as α:
β
β1
β2
β1 β2
α
Arguably, there’s nothing more to the truth of a claim like R than this—that
is, ‘α is twice as long as β’ just means something to the effect of ‘α is as long
as two duplicates of β joined end-to-end.’
Call the operation of joining objects end-to-end concatenation. By reference,
then, to ordinal comparisons between duplicates and their concatenations, we’re
able to give straightforward qualitative meaning to R. And we can easily gen-
eralise this idea to explain arbitrary (rational) ratio comparisons.3 For positive
integers n,m, say that α is n/m times as long as β whenever there’s some object
γ such that:
(i) α is as long as the concatenation of n duplicates of γ
(ii) β is as long as the concatenation of m duplicates of γ
Let x designate γ’s length in whatever units you like—say, furlongs. Intuitively,
α must then be n·x furlongs long, and β m·x furlongs long. Hence, α is n/m
times as long as β.
3 It’s possible to explain irrational ratio comparisons with a variation on the same basic
strategy. But to keep things relatively simple, we’ll stick to rational comparisons throughout.
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Hiding in the background here is a crucial assumption: that the operation
of concatenation behaves as a kind of qualitative analogue of addition. We rely
on this assumption to move from, e.g., ‘α is as long as the concatenation of n
duplicates of an object that’s x furlongs long’ to ‘α is n·x furlongs long’—i.e.,
the length of a concatenation is just the sum of the lengths of the concatenands.
(Imagine if, instead, concatenation worked like quaddition: whenever you con-
catenate up to 57 duplicates together, things are as usual; but concatenate more
and the result is always as long as 5 duplicates. We could then use concatena-
tions to define our way up to one object’s being 57 times as long than another,
but no further.)
Fortunately, the analogy between concatenation and addition is quite close.
Where
α %l β iff α is at least as long as β,
α ∼l β iff α is exactly as long as β,
α⊕ β = the concatenation of α and β,
then %l is transitive and complete, ∼l is just the symmetric part of %l , and ⊕
satisfies the following properties in relation to %l : for all disjoint objects α, β, γ,
1. α⊕ β %l β (positivity)
2. α⊕ β ∼l β ⊕ α (commutativity)
3. α⊕ (β ⊕ γ) ∼l (α⊕ β)⊕ γ (associativity)
4. α %l β iff α⊕ γ %l β ⊕ γ (monoticity)
To which we can compare essential properties of + in relation to ≥ and =, where
n and m are non-negative real numbers:
1. n+m ≥ m (positivity)
2. n+m = m+ n (commutativity)
3. n+ (m+ k) = (n+m) + k (associativity)
4. n ≥ m iff, for any k, n+ k ≥ m+ k (monotonicity)
Indeed, with a rich enough space of objects and a further ‘Archimedean’ condi-
tion (roughly: no object is infinitely longer than another), we can say something
stronger: where O is the set of concrete objects and R+ the positive reals, the
qualitative system < O,%l ,⊕ > has (basically) the same formal structure as
the numerical system < R+,≥,+ >. Thus, we can assign numbers to objects in
such a way that %l is modelled by ≥, and ⊕ is modelled by +. And with that
in hand, we can start to define up ratios of lengths, differences in length, ratios
of differences in length, and so on—i.e., we have the basic resources needed to
explain how our assignments of numerical lengths carry ratio information.
The upshot: numerical lengths represent a fully qualitative system of ordi-
nal length comparisons with an ‘additive’ structure over concatenations. We’re
justified in treating ratios of lengths as meaningful because there exists an op-
eration on objects that is intuitively and formally like ‘adding’ lengths together.
And we can apply the same basic ideas to account for the measurement of other
(extensive) quantities. For instance, α has twice as much mass as β iff α is as
massive as the concatenation of two mass-duplicates of β. Likewise, an event
E1 has twice the duration of E2 iff E1 could be split into two disjoint events
each with the same duration as E2.
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To apply the the same ideas to the measurement of belief, comparativists
have historically sought to identify an operation on the relata of a subject’s
comparative beliefs (i.e., propositions) that behaves, with respect to those be-
liefs, similarly enough to addition to justify treating it as a qualitative analogue
thereof. So let’s see how that plays out in practice.
3 The Many Faces of Comparativism
In this section, I’ll outline four varieties of comparativism of (roughly) increasing
generality. This will require some formal machinery, so I’ll start by laying down
some background assumptions and vocabulary that will be used throughout.
I will assume that for any thinking subject S, the propositions regarding
which S has beliefs can be modelled as subsets of some space of logically possible
worlds, Ω. By ‘logically possible’, I mean no more than that the worlds are closed
under a consequence relation at least as strong as that of classical propositional
logic. (So, Ω can include metaphysically impossible worlds, if that’s what floats
your boat.) The restriction to possible words will matter for some of my critical
points, especially in §4.4, and I’ll explain its relevance in §5.4 when I respond
to objections.
Next, let BS ⊆ ℘(Ω) denote that set of propositions regarding which S has
beliefs (i.e., whether partial or comparative). So, if S thinks p is more likely
than q, then p, q ∈ BS ; and if S partially believes r to any degree, then r ∈ BS .
For simplicity, I’ll assume throughout that BS is an algebra of sets on Ω:
Definition 1. B ⊆ ℘(Ω) is an algebra of sets on Ω iff, ∀p, q ∈ ℘(Ω),
(i) Ω ∈ B
(ii) If p ∈ B, then Ω \ p ∈ B
(iii) If p, q ∈ B, then p ∪ q ∈ B
Given this, I’ll assume that every S’s full range of comparative beliefs can be
modelled with a single binary relation %S on BS , where
p %S q iff S believes p at least as much as she believes q
I’ll refer to %S as S’s belief ranking. (From now on, I’ll drop the indices from ‘%’
and ‘B’ except when needed to avoid ambiguity.) Implicit in this assumption
are two commitments that comparativists in general need not accept, which are
worth pausing to highlight.
First, where  and ∼ stand for the doxastic comparatives more probable and
equally probable respectively, I’m assuming that p ∼ q iff (p % q) & (q % p), and
p  q iff (p % q) &¬(q % p). In other words, ∼ and  constitute the symmetric
and asymmetric parts of % respectively; hence, p % q iff (p  q) ∨ (p ∼ q).
Nothing about this is obvious or trivial. For example, Sally might think that p
is at least as likely as q, without thinking that p is more likely than q, or that
p is just as likely as q. Nevertheless, the assumption will simplify the discussion
considerably, and nothing of critical importance will hang on it.
Second, by assuming that comparative beliefs can be represented by a binary
relation, I’m ignoring an important class of comparativist views—advocated
for example by Koopman (1940) and Hawthorne (2016)—according to which
comparative beliefs will be better represented by a quaternary relation %?,
p, q %? r, s iff S believes p given q at least as much as she believes r given s
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Most of the central critical points raised in what follows have close analogues for
(let’s call it) quaternary comparativism. But, if it turns out that my arguments
work only against binary comparativism, I’ll still consider that a win.
Finally, where a function Cr assigns real numbers to the propositions in B,
I’ll say that Cr almost agrees with % iff, for all relevant propositions p, q,
p % q only if Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q)
Furthermore, Cr agrees with % just in case
p % q iff Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q)
I’ll treat agreement as symmetric: % agrees with Cr iff Cr agrees with %. A func-
tion Cr agrees with % whenever it assigns values in a way that precisely reflects
their order in the belief ranking—in other words, whenever it’s an ordinal-scale
measure of %.
Finally, assuming that Cr agrees with S’s belief ranking, say that Cr consti-
tutes a fully adequate model of S’s beliefs whenever
S believes p n/m times as much as she believes q iff Cr(p) = n
m
· Cr(q)
We can also say that Cr is L-to-R adequate just in case the left-to-right direction
of those biconditionals hold, and R-to-L adequate just in case the right-to-left
directions hold. Only an assignment of numerical strengths that’s fully ade-
quate licenses both directions of inference we saw at the beginning of §2—i.e.,
from claims about cardinal comparisons to numerical strengths, and from claims
about numerical strengths to cardinal comparisons. As such, it’s arguably only
fully adequate models that are sufficient to accommodate all of the facts about
how we think and talk about partial beliefs.
With that said, individual comparativists may want to reject full adequacy in
favour of mere L-to-R or R-to-L adequacy. To keep the discussion from spiralling
out of control, however, I’ll assume that full adequacy is what we ought to be
striving for when developing an account of ‘where the numbers come from’. (This
won’t matter a great deal to my critical points in §4, which generate concerns
even if we focus only on L-to-R or R-to-L adequacy.)
3.1 Probabilistic Comparativism
We’ll start with the most limited, but historically most common, variety of
comparativism. First, consider the usual definition of a probability function:
Definition 2. Cr : B 7→ R is a probability function iff ∀p, q ∈ B,
(i) Cr(Ω) = 1
(ii) Cr(p) ≥ 0
(iii) If p ∩ q = ∅, then Cr(p ∪ q) = Cr(p) + Cr(q)
It follows immediately from criterion (iii), that if a probability function—any
probability function—agrees with %, then the union of disjoint sets will behave
just like + with respect to %. Great! That’s exactly what we were looking for.
Moreover, we know the exact conditions under which belief rankings agree with
a probability function. Where B is finite, the following are individually necessary
and jointly sufficient (see Scott 1964):
7
A1. % is complete
A2. % is transitive
A3. Ω  ∅
A4. ∅ is minimal
A5. Where 1p denotes the indicator function of p, and (pi)
n
i=1 and (qi)
n
i=1
are finite sequences of propositions from B, then if
(i)
∑n
i=1 1pi(ω) =
∑n
i=1 1qi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, and
(ii) pi % qi, for i = 1, ..., n− 1,
then qn % pn
For this reason, comparativists have frequently suggested that, at least when
% satisfies A1–A5, partial beliefs are ratio-scale measurable, with the union of
disjoint sets playing the role of concatenation.
However, we can say something more general than this, and doing so will be
useful in demonstrating continuity with the varieties of comparativism discussed
below. First, note that criterion (iii) also implies:
(iv) If Cr(p ∩ q) = 0, then Cr(p ∪ q) = Cr(p) + Cr(q)
That is, probability functions are also additive with respect to the union of what
we might call pseudodisjoint propositions, where p and q are pseudodisjoint for
Sally just in case she has zero confidence in their intersection, p ∩ q. Or,
Definition 3. p is minimal iff q % p for all q ∈ B, and maximal iff p % q
for all q ∈ B
Definition 4. P ⊆ B is a set of pseudodisjoint propositions iff, for any
P? ⊆ P where |P?| ≥ 2 and any minimal q,⋂
P? ∼ q
Furthermore, propositions p1, ..., pn are pairwise pseudodisjoint iff there’s
a set of pseudodisjoint propositions P such that p1, ..., pn ∈ P
That is, assuming that Sally has exactly zero confidence in p whenever p is
minimal, Definition 4 plausibly characterises in comparative terms what it is for
Sally to think that at most one proposition from p1, ..., pn is true.
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So with that in hand, we can note that A1–A5 jointly imply that % is
Archimedean and, where p, q, r are pairwise pseudodisjoint,
1. (p ∪ q) % q (positivity)
2. (p ∪ q) ∼ (q ∪ p) (commutativity)
3. (p ∪ (q ∪ r)) ∼ ((p ∪ q) ∪ r) (associativity)
4. p % q iff (p ∪ r) % (q ∪ r) (monotonicity)
And that also looks like exactly what we needed: if some probability function
agrees with %—i.e., if A1–A5 are satisfied—then the union of pseudodisjoint
sets relates to that belief ranking exactly as + relates to ≥.
4 Definition 4 implies that every singleton set {p} ∈ B is trivially a ‘set of pseudodisjoint
propositions.’ This is a feature, not a bug. The rather tortured definition will be useful later
on, when we move away from probability functions.
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So let’s turn these mathematical points into a philosophical hypothesis. Let
probabilistic comparativism denote any comparativist theory that’s committed
to the following conditional:
Probabilistic Comparativism. If Cr is the unique probability func-
tion that agrees with S’s belief ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate model
of S’s beliefs
Note the requirement that the probability function be unique. This is necessary
to avoid contradiction. For any non-trivial algebra B, there will always be some
probability functions on B that agree with the very same belief ranking. And
since any two probability functions on the same domain will disagree on at
least some ratios, a general pattern of inference from ‘Cr(q) = n/m · Cr(q)’ to
‘S believes p n/m times as much as q’ will be valid only when the Cr is unique
in the relevant sense. In other words, R-to-L adequacy presupposes uniqueness,
which in turn requires further conditions on %.
There are several conditions that suffice to establish uniqueness. Of particu-
lar note is the following, which Stefa´nsson (2017, 2018) uses to ensure uniqueness
in his recent defences of comparativism:
Continuity. For all non-minimal p, q, there are p′, q′ such that p ∼ p′,
q ∼ q′, and p′ and q′ are each the union of some subset of a finite set of
disjoint propositions {r1, ..., rn} such that ri ∼ rj for i, j = 1, ..., n
The interested reader can see (Krantz et al. 1971, §5.2) and (Fishburn 1986) for
a range of other conditions sufficient to ensure uniqueness.
Now, probabilistic comparativism clearly has some resources to put forward
an account of ratio comparisons, in the event that % satisfies the requisite con-
ditions. (By this, I don’t mean that probabilistic comparativism gives the right
account, just that it’s in a position to offer something.) Consider the following
principle, which is the comparative belief version of how we defined rational
ratio comparisons for length:5
General Ratio Principle. S believes p n/m times as much as q if
(i) For 0 < n ≤ m, there are m non-minimal, equiprobable pairwise
pseudodisjoint propositions r1, ..., rm such that q ∼ (r1 ∪ · · · ∪ rm)
and p ∼ (r1 ∪ · · · ∪ rn); or
(ii) S believes p n′/m′ times as much as r, and believes r n′′/m′′ times as
much as q, where n/m = n′·n′′/m′·m′′
So, for instance, Sally will take p to be twice as probable as q if there is some
proposition q′ that’s obviously inconsistent with q such that q ∼ q′ and (q∪q′) ∼
p. In this case, q and q′ are acting as ‘duplicates’ of one another, and q ∪ q′ is
their ‘concatenation’.
3.2 Imprecise-Probabilistic Comparativism
Say that Cr coheres with the General Ratio Principle (henceforth: GRP) just
in case, whenever that principle implies that p is believed n/m times as much as
5 The first clause of the General Ratio Principle is a close relative of Stefa´nsson’s (2018)
‘Ratio Principle.’ The second (inductive) clause is new—in the context of Continuity it’s
redundant, but see §3.3 for it put to work.
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q, then Cr(p) = n/m· Cr(q); otherwise, it conflicts with the GRP. Interestingly,
if any probability function almost agrees with % and ∅ is minimal, then that
function coheres with the GRP. This means that it’s possible to extend the
account of ratio comparisons just given to imprecise probabilities and incomplete
belief rankings.
For non-ideal agents, completeness (A1) is widely considered highly implau-
sible. We should expect plenty of gaps in %. Consider the following example,
adapted from (Fishburn 1986):
p = The global population in 2100 will be greater than 13 billion
q = The next card drawn from this old and incomplete deck will be a heart
p and q are sufficiently far removed from one another that it’s hard to make a
judgement as to which is more likely than the other. Similar examples abound.
There’s a natural way of dealing with incompleteness to which comparativists
can (and do) appeal. Where F is any set of real-valued functions on ℘(Ω), say
this time that the set F agrees with % just in case for all relevant p, q,
p % q iff ∀Cr ∈ F, Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q)
The idea behind a set-of-functions model is to recapture the belief ranking by
supervaluating over the functions in F—only what’s common to every such is
treated as having representative import. Whenever % fails to hold between p
and q, F will contain at least one pair of probability functions that disagree on
the relative ordering of p and q; hence, we manage to ‘numerically’ represent %.
Where B is finite, a set of probability functions agrees with % just in case
the latter satisfies A2–A4 plus a very slightly stronger version of A5 (see Alon
and Lehrer 2014):
A5′. Where (pi)ni=1 and (qi)
n
i=1 are finite sequences of propositions, and
(ki)
n
i=1 is a finite sequence of natural numbers, then if
(i)
∑n
i=1 ki·1pi(ω) =
∑n
i=1 ki·1qi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, and
(ii) pi % qi, for i = 1, ..., n− 1,
then qn % pn
Furthermore, while there will often be more than one set of probability functions
F that agrees with %, the union of all such sets will always agree with %. So,
whenever % satisfies A1–A5 there’s always a unique set of probability functions
that agrees with % that’s maximal with respect to inclusion.
Hence, if we extend the definitions of full / L-to-R / R-to-L adequacy in the
natural way (i.e., by inserting ‘∀Cr ∈ F’ in the appropriate locations), we can
characterise imprecise-probabilistic comparativism by its commitment to:
Imprecise-Probabilistic Comparativism. If a non-empty set of prob-
ability functions F agrees with S’s belief ranking and F is maximal with
respect to inclusion, then F is a fully adequate model of S’s beliefs
Imprecise-probabilistic comparativism implies the precise version. That is, if we
assume that F and Cr are essentially the same model whenever F = {Cr}, then
the two varieties of comparativism say exactly the same thing whenever exactly
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one probability function agrees with %. Furthermore, every Cr in a set F that
agrees with % will itself almost agree with %. So, if we also extend the definition
of coherence in the natural way to sets of functions, it follows that if a set of
probability functions F agrees with %, then F coheres with the GRP. In short,
both versions of comparativism explain cardinal comparisons using basically the
same idea.
3.3 The Ramseyan Alternative
The benefit of imprecise-probabilistic comparativism is that it’s able to explain
cardinal comparisons in a strictly wider range of conditions. But it’s possible
to go further still. A2–A5′ are sufficient for the union of pseudodisjoint sets to
behave like addition; they’re by no means necessary.
I’ll end this section with two new and more general ‘Ramseyan’ varieties of
comparativism, and I’ll show that they’re about as general as comparativism
can get so long as it’s committed to the foregoing explanation of cardinality in
terms of unions of pseudodisjoint sets. Both are inspired by the following remark
from Ramsey (1929):
[...] ‘Well, I believe it to an extent 2/3’, i.e. (this at least is the most
natural interpretation) ‘I have the same degree of belief in it as in
p∨ q when I think p, q, r equally likely and know that exactly one of
them is true’. (p. 256)
The idea is also discussed briefly by Weatherson (2016, pp. 223–4), who likewise
puts it forward as a basis for more general variety of comparativism. However,
neither Ramsey nor Weatherson take their discussion beyond this very initial
suggestion, and (as we’ll see) there’s a few conditions that need to be met before
it can ground a minimally plausible account of partial belief.
First, some more definitions:
Definition 5. A set of n pseudodisjoint propositions P is an n-scale of
p iff
⋃
P ∼ p and for all q, q′ in P, q ∼ q′
We can take Definition 5 as a comparativist characterisation of what it is for
an agent to think that q’s as likely as a disjunction of equiprobable propositions
at most one of which is true. So, e.g., if Sally thinks q is as likely as p1 ∪ p2,
where p1 and p2 are equiprobable and pseudodisjoint, then {p1, p2} is a 2-scale
of q. We’ll also need to assume that Sally is certain of p’s truth just in case p is
maximal. This is non-trivial, for reasons we’ll discuss below, but it also appears
to be unavoidable given the limited resources with which certainty might be
defined within the framework of (binary) comparativism.
Given this, Ramsey’s idea becomes:
Sally believes p to degree n/m if p ∼ (q1 ∪ · · · ∪ qn),
where the q1, ..., qn belong to an m-scale {q1, ..., qn, ..., qm} of some maximal
proposition r. A good start—but there’s a natural extension that will be helpful
to incorporate into what follows.
Consider the following situation: B is the powerset of Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, % is
transitive, and
Ω  {ω1, ω3} ∼ {ω2, ω3}  {ω1, ω2} ∼ {ω3}  {ω1} ∼ {ω2}  ∅
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We can represent % as follows, where the relative sizes of the boxes containing
the ωi correspond to the order of propositions in the belief ranking:
ω1 ω2
ω3
Ω
Now {Ω} is a 1-scale of Ω, and {{ω3}, {ω1, ω2}} is a 2-scale of Ω, so Ramsey
would say that
Cr(Ω) = 1, Cr({ω3}) = Cr({ω1, ω2}) = 1/2
However, the singletons {ω1} and {ω2} don’t belong to any n-scale of Ω, so
Ramsey’s idea doesn’t yet give us any strength with which they’re believed.
But since {{ω1}, {ω2}} is a 2-scale of {ω1, ω2}, it’s only reasonable to say that
Cr({ω1}) = Cr({ω2}) = 1/4.
Likewise, consider the following case, where Ω = {ω1, ..., ω6}:
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
ω6
ω5
Ω
Here, assume that Ω is maximal and ∅ minimal, and % includes:
{ω5, ω6} ∼ {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}  {ω6} ∼ {ω1, ω2, ω3}  {ω1}
{ω1} ∼ {ω2} ∼ {ω3} ∼ {ω4} ∼ {ω5}
This time, {{ω5, ω6}, {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}} is a 2-scale of Ω, and {ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3} are
three members of the 4-scale {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}} of {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}; we’d
therefore like to say that Cr({ω1, ω2, ω3}) = 3/4·1/2 = 3/8. We note also that
{{ω6}} is a 1-scale of {ω1, ω2, ω3}; hence, Cr({ω6}) = 3/8.
We can capture the foregoing points by means of the following definition:
Definition 6. For integers n,m such that m ≥ n ≥ 0, m > 0, p is
(i) 0/m-valued if p is minimal and m/m-valued if p is maximal
(ii) n/m-valued if p ∼ (q1 ∪ · · · ∪ qn′), where the q1, ..., qn′ belong to an
m′-scale of an n′′/m′′-valued proposition, and n′·n′′/m′·m′′ = n/m
The generalised version of Ramsey’s suggestion now amounts to the claim that
Sally believes p to degree n/m if p is n/m-valued. As such, define a Ramsey
function as follows:
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Definition 7. Cr : B 7→ [0, 1] is a Ramsey function (relative to %) iff,
for all p ∈ B, if p is n/m-valued, then Cr(p) = n/m
The connection between Ramsey functions and the GRP should be immediately
apparent. In fact, in present terminology, the first (non-inductive) clause of the
GRP states that for m ≥ n, p is believed n/m times as much as q whenever P
is an m-scale of q, and P′ ⊆ P is an n-scale of p. In this case, for any Ram-
sey function Cr, Cr(p) = n/m · Cr(q). With respect to n/m-valued propositions,
Ramsey functions cohere with the GRP perfectly.
Essentially, a Ramsey function scales every non-minimal n/m-valued propo-
sition relative to a maximal proposition, which has a stipulated value. With
respect to pairs of propositions that cannot be so scaled, however, a Ramsey
function may conflict with the GRP. An example where this could occur is:
ω1
ω2
ω3
Ω
Where
Ω  {ω2, ω3}  {ω1, ω2} ∼ {ω1, ω3}  {ω2} ∼ {ω3}  {ω1}  ∅
The only non-trivial n-scale is the 2-scale {{ω2}, {ω3}} of {ω2, ω3}; but, since
{ω2, ω3} can’t be scaled relative to Ω, the values of {ω2}, {ω3} and {ω2, ω3} are
left indeterminate.
Call any proposition that’s n/m-valued ‘Ramsey-scalable’. Ramsey says noth-
ing about how to measure propositions that aren’t Ramsey-scalable, and this
is an important lacuna in his proposal—though perhaps not a very troubling
one. One might assume that such cases don’t exist. Let N designate the set of
Ramsey-scalable propositions. Then, the assumption would be:
B1. N = B
B1 isn’t implied by A1–A5. However, it is implied by A4 plus Continuity. (Let
q be maximal, ∅ minimal, and consider any non-minimal p; Continuity then
states that {p} is a 1-scale of the union of n members of an m-scale of q, which
is strictly more than B1 requires.) In other words, probabilistic comparativists
have nothing to fear from a condition like B1.
But B1 only ensures that every p ∈ B is Ramsey-scalable. It isn’t yet enough
to ground a plausible comparativist story. There’s still two additional problems
that can arise in the absence of further conditions on %.
First: nothing’s been said to guarantee that Definition 7 is consistent. With-
out further assumptions, it’s entirely possible for, e.g., p ∼ q, where for some
r, p belongs to a 2-scale of r and q belongs to a 3-scale of r. This is clearly
undesirable: Sally can’t believe p to the degrees 1/2 and 1/3 simultaneously! If
13
Ramsey functions are to be well-defined, we’ll need to ensure that if p is both
n/m-valued and n′/m′-valued, then n/m = n′/m′.
Second: nothing’s been said to guarantee that a Ramsey function relative
to % will even agree with %. Indeed, nothing ensures that Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q) if or
only if p % q—p could be 1/2-valued, and q 1/4-valued, yet q % p. This is also
undesirable: if the order of the values we assign propositions don’t match up
to the belief ranking, then there’s no natural sense in which those values are a
measure of the strengths with which those propositions are believed.
In the context of B1, we can kill these two birds with one stone by making
the following rather strong assumption:
B2. If p is n/m-valued and q is n′/m′-valued, then p % q iff n/m ≥ n′/m′
B2 is obviously necessary (and given B1, sufficient) to avoid both worries, as
the following establishes:
Theorem 1. % satisfies B2 iff there exists a Ramsey function Cr with
respect to %; furthermore, Cr is the unique Ramsey function relative to
% that agrees with % iff % satisfies B1
(Proofs for all theorems in this section can be found in the Appendix.)
It’s easy to see that B2 is implied already by A1–A5. Indeed, if any proba-
bility function Cr agrees with %, then Cr is also a Ramsey function relative to
%. Moreover, where B1 plus A1–A5 hold, then the unique probability function
that agrees with % is the unique Ramsey function that agrees with %.
In the other direction, we can also easily see that while B1–B2 jointly im-
ply A1–A2, they don’t imply A3–A5/A5′. It’s straightforward to find examples
where B1–B2 are satisfied but A3–A4 aren’t; and for an example where A5/A5′
is falsified, assume again that Ω = {w1, w2, w3}, and:
{w1, w2}  Ω ∼ {w1} ∼ {w2}  {w3} ∼ {w1, w3} ∼ {w2, w3} ∼ ∅
As {{w1}, {w2}} is a 2-scale of the maximal {w1, w2}, Cr({w1, w2}) = 1 and
Cr({w1}) = 1/2. Ω isn’t maximal, but it’s as likely as {w1}; so Cr(Ω) = 1/2.
In short, B2 imposes a very limited kind of qualitative additivity on %,
specifically with respect to comparative beliefs between propositions constructed
out of members of the same n-scale of any n′/m′-valued proposition. Roughly:
within an n-scale, % behaves probabilistically—but not every proposition is
constructible out of the members of an appropriate n-scale, and across n-scales
% can behave quite irrationally indeed.
If we wanted to drop B1 out of the picture, we could do so by adopting a
set-of-functions representation of %. For that, we would need to add at least:
B3. % is a preorder
For simplicity, we focus on the case where B is countable; thus,
Theorem 2. Where B is countable, % satisfies B2–B3 iff there exists a
nonempty set F of real-valued functions bounded by 0 and 1 that agrees
with %, where every Cr in F is a Ramsey function relative to %
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Furthermore, whenever B2–B3 are satisfied, there will be a unique set F that’s
maximal with respect to inclusion.
Given the above, let’s characterise two ‘Ramseyan’ comparativisms:
Ramseyan Comparativism. If Cr is the only Ramsey function relative
to S’s belief ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate model of S’s beliefs
Imprecise-Ramseyan Comparativism. If F is a non-empty set of
Ramsey functions with respect to S’s belief ranking, which is maximal
with respect to inclusion and agrees with %, then F is an R-to-L adequate
model of S’s beliefs
Note that imprecise-Ramseyan comparativism only claims R-to-L adequacy.
This is because (as we’ve seen) B2–B3 are not sufficient for total coherence
with the GRP. But both Ramseyan comparativisms agree with probabilistic
comparativism whenever A1–A5 and B1 are satisfied.6
Finally, we can show that B2 and B3 are individually necessary for coherence
with the GRP. For B3 this is trivial: the condition is obviously necessary for any
real-valued function or set thereof to agree with %. And given some minimal
scaling assumptions, violations of B2 imply that any Cr that agrees with %
won’t cohere with the GRP:
Theorem 3. If (i) Cr agrees with %, (ii) there are p, q such that p  q,
and (iii) Cr(r) = 0 whenever r is minimal, then Cr coheres with the GRP
only if B2
Corollary: under the same assumptions, mutatis mutandis, a set of functions
F coheres with the GRP only if B2. In other words, assuming just that % is
non-trivial and that minimal propositions can be assigned value 0, coherence
with the GRP implies B2–B3.
4 Inexpressibility Challenges
Let’s take stock. The standard comparativist strategy for explaining ratio com-
parisons is based on a purported continuity with the measurement of extensive
quantities like length and mass: to say that p is n times more likely than q,
we just need to be able to say that p is as likely as the union of n ‘duplicates’
of q, where the ‘duplicates’ are propositions that are equiprobable and pairwise
pseudodisjoint. The Ramseyan comparativisms just outlined offer an accounts of
when this kind of ‘adding’ is meaningful that generalise the conditions assumed
by probabilistic comparativism, applying in a wide range of cases that aren’t
probabilistically representable. Moreover, we know that the union of pseudodis-
joint sets behaves like addition only given B2 and B3.
It remains to be seen whether it’s correct to say that p is n times more
likely than q iff p is as likely as n pseudodisjoint duplicates of q. The examples
of this section provide reasons to doubt both directions of that biconditional.
More generally, they establish that there are some seemingly sensible distinctions
between belief states that comparativists, in principle, cannot make.
6 This is not so obvious in the case of imprecise-Ramseyan comparativism, but consider:
if A1–A5 and B1 hold, then the probability function Cr that agrees with % is the Ramsey
function that agrees with %; from imprecise-Ramseyan comparativism, Cr is R-to-L adequate,
so Cr determines a unique ratio comparison for every pair of non-minimal propositions; and
finally, S cannot believe p n/m times as much as q and n′/m′ as much as q, for n/m 6= n′/m′.
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4.1 Almost Omniscience
Consider Zeus, who knows almost everything:
Example 1. Zeus is almost omniscient : his comparative beliefs satisfy
A1–A5, and he’s certain that the actual world is either w1 or w2. While
he’s got some confidence in each, he’s a little more confident that the
actual world is ω1 than that it’s ω2.
I take it that the notion of almost omniscience makes sense. It already exists
in the literature, in the case of David Lewis’ two gods (Lewis 1979, pp. 520–1).
And we could easily imagine each of Lewis’ gods having more or less confidence
regarding which of the two (centred) worlds they inhabit. However, no variety of
comparativism that’s been described so far has the resources to accommodate
Example 1 as described.
I focus my discussion on the probabilistic comparativisms; the issues are
analogous for the Ramseyan varieties. Let B be any algebra of sets relative to
any Ω, and a probability function Cr will almost agree with Zeus’s belief ranking
% iff for all p ∈ B,
Cr(p) =

0, if ω1, ω2 6∈ p
x, if ω1 ∈ p, ω2 6∈ p
y, if ω2 ∈ p, ω1 6∈ p
1, if ω1, ω2 ∈ p,
where 1 ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0 and x + y = 1, with full agreement whenever 1 > x >
y > 0. There’s uncountably many probability functions that agree with %, so
probabilistic comparativism tells us nothing about Zeus’s situation.
More importantly, imprecise probabilistic comparativism fares no better. To
slightly abuse notation, let Cr(ωi) pick out Zeus’s confidence that the actual
world is ωi. The imprecise-probabilistic comparativist can then say that Cr(ω1)
takes the ‘imprecise’ value [0.5, 1], and Cr(ω2) takes [0, 0.5]. But regardless of
how you want to interpret those values—i.e., if you read them as saying that
there’s no fact of the matter about what the strengths of Zeus’s beliefs are
within that range, or if read them as saying that his beliefs determinately have
imprecise strengths—you don’t get to say that Zeus has a little more (or a lot,
or twice as much, etc.) confidence in ω1 as in ω2. By virtue of learning almost
everything there is to know, Zeus has lost the capacity to believe one thing just
a little more than another.
4.2 Jack and Jill
Here’s a similar case, this time involving interpersonal comparisons:
Example 2. Jack and Jill have identical comparative beliefs, each sat-
isfying A1–A5, over a simple finite algebra with atoms a1, a2, a3. They
agree that a3 is more likely than a2, a2 more likely than a1, and a1 ∪ a2
is just as likely as a3. However, Jack insists that, unlike Jill, he has at
least twice the confidence in a2 as in a1.
Jack and Jill’s situation should again make intuitive sense. (Nothing much hangs
here on the extreme paucity of the algebra, which is only for simplicity of ex-
position. We’ll be able to find similar examples using any non-trivial algebra.)
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In pictorial form,
a1 a2
a3
Jack
Ω
a1 a2
a3
Jill
Ω
Comparativists cannot accept Jack’s claim: if Jack and Jill have identical com-
parative beliefs, then they have identical beliefs simpliciter. (Recall the charac-
terisation of comparativism from §1.) The question for us is: can we have good
reasons to think that Jack is telling the truth?
I think we can. A probability function Cr agrees with Jack’s belief ranking
(and hence also Jill’s belief ranking) just in case
1. Cr(a3) = 0.5 > Cr(a2) > 0.25 > Cr(a1) > 0, and
2. Cr(a1) + Cr(a2) = 0.5
As with Example 1, there are many probability functions satisfying these con-
ditions. And, crucially, each such function predicts a different set of preferences
when it’s (a) taken to model a possible belief state, and (b) combined with a
standard model of rational preferences. Suppose for instance that Jack and Jill
each face choices which share a similar structure:
a1 a2 a3
α −2x x x
β 0 0 x
Jack prefers α to β; Jill has the opposite preferences. Assuming Cr is a prob-
ability function satisfying the stated conditions, α’s expected utility is greater
than β’s just in case Cr(a2) > 1/3. So, a natural explanation for the difference
is that Jack believes a2 to a degree greater than 1/3, and Jill less than 1/3.
Comparativists are committed to saying that the difference in Jack’s and
Jill’s preferences cannot be due to any differences of belief—there are none.
Indeed, since their preferences differ but their choices have the same structure,
comparativists seem committed to saying that either at least one of Jack or Jill
has chosen irrationally, or that neither of them ought to choose either of the
options. The former looks hard to accept, as there’s nothing especially irrational
about either pattern of preferences. And the latter fails to offer a satisfying
explanation in the event that their choices consistently point to Jack believing
a2 more than 1/3, and Jill less than 1/3. For example, we could imagine that in
the following kind of situation, Jack prefers δ to γ, and Jill γ to δ:
a1 a2 a3
γ 2x −x x
δ 0 0 x
And we could generate countless more decision situations to tell them apart.
There’s a natural explanation for why Jack and Jill would consistently choose
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‘as if’ they believed a2 more than 1/3 and less than 1/3 respectively, and it’s
strictly off-limits to comparativism.
4.3 Logical Doubts
This time, we assume that only one probability/Ramsey function agrees with
the relevant belief ranking:
Example 3. Although his comparative beliefs satisfy A1–A5 and B1,
Agrippa is not the perfect Bayesian. After reading a little too much
Pyrrhonian literature, he insists it’s never rational to be fully certain of
anything: one should always reserve some slight doubt (say, 1%) that
even the most firm of logical truths might be false, and that any log-
ical falsehood might be true. Moreover, his preferences consistently re-
flect this—e.g., he’d prefer $90 to the gamble 〈$100 if p ∨ ¬p, −$1000
otherwise〉, and he prefers 〈$100 if p ∨ ¬p, $100, 000 otherwise〉 to being
given $1000 outright.
Here’s a natural explanation of Agrippa’s preferences: where Cr is the probability
function that uniquely agrees with Agrippa’s belief ranking, his partial beliefs
are in fact faithfully modelled by the non-probabilistic function Cr?, where
Cr?(p) = 0.98 · Cr(p) + 0.01
(Think of Cr? as Cr squished down by 1% on either side.) Cr? conflicts with
the GRP everywhere, but if we plug it into an ordinary account of preference
formation it fits perfectly well with his preferences.7 Say what you will about
the rationality of doubting logical truths, at least Agrippa chooses rationally
given his beliefs.
But, again, such an explanation is off-limits to comparativism. Indeed, all
four versions of comparativism I’ve described are committed to saying that the
probabilistic Cr is a fully adequate model of Agrippa’s beliefs, and that Cr? mis-
represents him: synchronically, Agrippa is an epistemically ideal Bayesian agent,
despite the evidence of his preferences and his protestations to the contrary.
4.4 Non-Additivity and the GRP
The above examples are fanciful, but it’s important not to miss the more general
point they’re intended to convey. If it sounds too strange to say that Zeus can
be almost omniscient, or that Agrippa might have some slight doubt in even the
most basic of logical truths despite considering them more probable than any-
thing else, then never fear: whenever any probability/Ramsey function agrees
with %, no matter how uniquely, there are infinitely many ordinal transforma-
tions of that function (with values bounded by 1 and 0) that we could draw
7 I should note that this example doesn’t rely on the error that Joyce (2015, pp. 418–9)
discusses, of re-scaling the model of Agrippa’s beliefs without making appropriate adjustments
to how expected utilities are calculated—thus giving the misleading impression that Cr? gen-
erates different predictions about Agrippa’s preferences when they’re plugged into an expected
utility model of preference formation. For we get to say that Cr? is a mere re-scaling of Cr
only under the substantive assumption that whatever Agrippa believes most (least) of all, he
believes to the most (least) extent possible. The scale we use to measure belief is a matter
of stipulation, to be sure, but we don’t get to stipulate that maximality equates to certainty
without argument.
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upon to find counterexamples instead. Perhaps some of these transformations
fail to pick out genuinely distinct, possible belief states, but comparativists will
be hard pressed to show this for all of them.
Consider, for instance:
Example 4. Descartes doubts every contingent claim, being certain of
only the self-evident logical truths. His comparative beliefs satisfy A1–A5
and B1, and Cr is the unique probability function that agrees with them.
But his own self-attributions fit better with:
Cr†(p) =
{
1/10 · Cr(p), whenever Cr(p) < 1
Cr(p) otherwise,
Cr† is ordinally equivalent to Cr but with most values bunched up in the [0, 0.1]
range. Having partial beliefs like these is absurd, maybe even impossible. I’m
not sure whether it is, but that set that issue aside and compare Cr† to another
ordinal transformation that more smoothly shifts some of Cr’s values a little to
the left:
Example 5. Thomas is almost an ideal Bayesian. His comparative beliefs
satisfy A1–A5 and B1, and Cr is the unique probability function agrees
with them. But his own self-attributions fit better with:
Cr††(p) =

1/2 · Cr(p), whenever 0 ≤ Cr(p) < 0.05
3/4 · Cr(p), whenever 0.05 ≤ Cr(p) < 0.075
7/8 · Cr(p), whenever 0.075 ≤ Cr(p) < 0.0825
...
Cr(p) otherwise
Such a distribution looks neither absurd nor impossible. And absent independent
reasons, it’s very hard to accept that we should rule out the possibility of partial
beliefs like those modelled by Cr†† that fall just shy of probabilistic coherence.
Don’t be tempted to think that Example 5 isn’t so bad, because at least the
cardinal comparisons we get from applying the GRP to Thomas’ belief ranking
will in most cases approximate the comparisons encoded in Cr††. This is a non-
sequitor: the GRP gets every cardinal comparison exactly right for Cr, and Cr
and Cr†† are ordinal equivalents. So, if Cr is a fully adequate model of some
possible belief state—and of course it is—then comparativists are committed
to saying that Cr†† can’t be either an L-to-R or an R-to-L adequate model of
Thomas’ (or anyone else’s) beliefs. According to comparativism, Cr†† isn’t a
model of some slightly irrational beliefs for which the GRP is approximately
accurate—it’s not a model of any doxastic state at all. And that’s implausible.
Cr†† is an instance of a non-additive Choquet capacity, of the kind frequently
used to model beliefs in many descriptive-oriented models of partial beliefs and
decision-making.8 On such models, partial beliefs are represented with functions
such that Cr(p ∪ q) need not and frequently does not equal Cr(p) + Cr(q) even
when p and q are pseudodisjoint (or genuinely disjoint). The introduction of
8 A capacity can be defined as any monotonically increasing transformation of a probability
function which preserves the values for ∅ and Ω.
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non-additive models was motivated in part by a wealth of evidence suggesting
that the absolute and comparative confidence judgements of non-ideal thinkers
are non-additive with respect to the union of disjoint sets. See, e.g., (Tversky
and Kahneman 1982), (Yates and Carlson 1986), (Carlson and Yates 1989),
(Bar-Hillel and Neter 1993), (Tversky and Koehler 1994).9
There’s been no empirical work done on whether partial and comparative
beliefs are additive specifically with respect to the union of equiprobable pseu-
dodisjoint sets—though, Thomas’ beliefs hardly seem too far out of the ordi-
nary. Indeed, they’re consistent with multiple approaches to explaining non-
probabilistic confidence judgements. For example, on the ‘probability+noise’
model, comparative/partial beliefs roughly adhere to the norms of probability
theory, but for systematic deviations due to random ‘noise’ in cognitive process-
ing. Such noise can produce super-additive confidence judgements of the kind
seen in Example 5 (cf. Costello 2008; Fisher and Wolfe 2014).
Once we allow non-additive models of partial belief, we’re going to have
models that cannot be squared with the GRP. Indeed, for any non-probabilistic
capacity Cr, it will almost always be the case that:
(i) Cr is ordinally equivalent to some function that coheres with the GRP,
but itself conflicts with the GRP; or
(ii) Cr is not ordinally equivalent to any function that coheres with the GRP,
i.e., it agrees with a % that violates B2.
Examples 4–5 involve the former kind of capacity; for the latter, consider:
Example 6. Relative to Frank’s comparative beliefs, p1, ..., p100 and
q1, ..., q101 are two sequences of pairwise pseudodisjoint, equiprobable
propositions, with p1 ∼ q1. But due to a minor accounting error, Frank
thinks p1∪· · ·∪p100 is as likely as r, which is also as likely as q1∪· · ·∪q101.
According to the GRP, Frank believes r 100 times as much as p1 and 101 times as
much as p1, so r is believed 1% more than itself! But Frank’s comparative beliefs
violate B2. Does this mean that Frank just doesn’t have quantifiable beliefs with
respect to the pi and qi? Why should we say this when there are plenty of non-
additive capacities that agree with his belief ranking quite straightforwardly.
(Example: let the capacity be additive as usual with respect to the pi, and sub-
additive by 100/101% for significantly large unions of the qi.) All of them look
irrational to some extent or other, but most of them look possible, and they all
encode cardinal comparisons that conflict with the GRP.
5 Objections and Replies
5.1 Supplementing Comparativism
Each of the examples of the previous section involves non-uniqueness in some
way. One lesson to draw from them is that comparative beliefs are too coarse-
9 Of course, the literature on how close ordinary human beings come to being probabilis-
tically coherent is vast, and most of it controversial. I won’t attempt to review it here. But
even the most committed of ‘descriptive’ Bayesians will typically only claim that additive
probabilities are useful idealising models for analysing the computational problems that hu-
mans face in the domains where we should independently expect cognition to be especially
well optimised; e.g., vision, motor control, and language processing (Griffiths et al. 2012).
Outside these domains, there’s widespread agreement that the evidence for frequent fallacies
in quantitative and comparative probability judgements is overwhelming.
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grained to make sense of distinctions amongst partial belief states that seem
at least conceptually possible. So a natural thought would be to enrich the
supervenience base beyond what comparativism, strictly speaking, allows. If
comparativism per se doesn’t work, then perhaps something similar will.
Let supplemented comparativism denote the view that partial beliefs super-
vene on comparative beliefs plus something else. For example, while multiple
probability functions agree with Jill’s belief ranking, we may also find that only
one of those has maximal fit with her preferences and/or life history of evidence.
On that basis we might assign it as the uniquely correct model of her beliefs, and
thereby distinguish her from Jack. A representation theorem like that of (Joyce
1999) could help in providing the mathematical foundations for such a view. Or
we could supplement comparative belief with forms of qualitative judgement,
like whether p and q are probabilistically independent, or whether p is evidence
for q (cf. Joyce 2010, p. 288).
I have no general argument against supplemented comparativism to present
here—it isn’t the intended target of this paper. However, I will say this: it’s not
enough to just fix a unique assignment of numerical values (precise or imprecise)
to the agents described in the above cases. Uniqueness and fine-grainedness are
not the whole problem. We also need a plausible explanation of how we can
make cardinal comparisons. Any explanation in terms of equiprobable pseu-
dodisjoint propositions will not help us make sense of Zeus’s case—there are no
such propositions to ‘add’. And if non-probabilistic functions really do provide
good models of Agrippa’s, Descartes’, Thomas’, and Frank’s partial beliefs, then
every one of them is a counterexample to the GRP. Or consider Jack and Jill.
Perhaps supplemented comparativism could use preference information to de-
termine that Jack believes a1 to a degree greater than 1/3—but we’d still need a
justification for saying that Jack believes a2 at least twice as much a1, and Jill
believes a2 less than twice as much as she believes a1. That explanation cannot
come from any differences in their belief rankings.
An assignment of numbers without an empirically plausible explanation for
how those numbers manage to carry cardinal information isn’t a solution to com-
parativism’s expressibility problems, regardless of how unique it is. To deal with
the examples of §4, a different explanation of cardinal comparisons is needed.
The GRP is false, and supplementing comparativism with further facts to make
distinctions where mere belief rankings can’t just shifts the bump under the rug.
I suspect that when we finally do explain the cardinality of partial belief,
we’ll see that it has much to do with the relationship between partial beliefs and
preferences under conditions of uncertainty, and the union of (pseudo)disjoint
propositions won’t have much of a role at all. But more on that in §7.
5.2 ‘I only want to model ideally rational agents’
One common response to the counterexamples of §§4.3–4, which involve non-
ideal agents with comparative and/or partial beliefs that flout the orthodox
norms of probabilism, is that such agents simply aren’t relevant for philosophical
modelling purposes. We can safely ignore non-ideal agents, at least for now,
because what matters for philosophical purposes is that we have an explanation
of cardinality for ideally rational agents. And where ‘ideally rational agent’ is
given a probabilist reading, the GRP seems to work well for those kinds of
agents—at least when we set aside ‘extreme’ cases like Example 1.
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Now, there’s a reason that the GRP predicts accurate cardinal comparisons
for ideally rational agents, and it has nothing to do with comparativism: the
GRP is a good norm of rationality. According to probabilism, you’re rational
only if you have partial beliefs in alignment with the GRP. So there’s no surprise
on a probabilist conception of rationality, the principle generates accurate car-
dinal comparisons for ideally rational agents. This is common ground for proba-
bilist comparativists and non-comparativists alike. The question is whether the
GRP also reflects some interesting dependence relationship.
If it does, then presumably that same relationship should hold for non-ideal
agents. It would be unreasonable to say that Sally doesn’t have partial beliefs
encoding interesting cardinal information just because she isn’t ideally rational.
Even if she were highly irrational, Sally could still believe one proposition much
more than another, or at least twice as another. Our capacity to make cardinal
comparisons isn’t hostage to any presupposition of ideal rationality. Because of
this, comparativists should want to show that their explanation of cardinality is
plausibly generalisable. For if there doesn’t seem much hope for generalising to
non-ideal agents, then we’ve got reason to think that the explanation is false—
even in the case of ideally rational agents.
Let me emphasise: none of this is to deny the obvious claim that it’s usually
fruitful to get an explanation of some phenomenon working for an idealised
model first, before moving on to less idealised cases. That’s how the development
of most good explanations go in the sciences, and it’s exactly how we should
expect things to go for our theories of partial belief. But idealised models have
explanatory value only when the conclusions drawn from them are robust under
variations to their idealising conditions. Roughly, the model should not ‘break
down’ when their idealising conditions are perturbed. So it would be helpful if
we had some assurance that comparativism’s strategy for explaining cardinality
doesn’t depend crucially on idealised assumptions.
The examples in §4 are reasons to worry that comparativist explanations of
cardinality aren’t sufficiently generalisable. Comparativism is in principle blind
to perfectly sensible distinctions between infinitely many ordinally equivalent
partial belief states. And even if we ignore the problem of ordinal equivalents,
the comparativist explanation of cardinality requires that (i) there’s enough
equiprobable pseudodisjoint propositions around to ‘add’; (ii) an assumed equiv-
alence of maximality with certainty and minimality with zero confidence; and
(iii) that non-ideal agents with quantifiable beliefs will satisfy quite strong ratio-
nality conditions like B2—conditions that ordinary humans do seem to falsify.
5.3 Disjunctivism
A third response to cases involving probabilistically incoherent belief rankings
is disjunctivism: if the union of equiprobable pseudodisjoint sets doesn’t behave
additively for some non-ideal agents, then perhaps there’s another operation
that does behave additively with respect to their belief ranking and we can
characterise their cardinal comparisons in terms of that operation instead.
Note, first of all, that disjunctivism doesn’t seem to help with any of Ex-
amples 1–5. At best, it helps with cases like Example 6, and even then there
are still the worries arising from ordinally equivalent alternative functions. But
moreover, if different operations are supposed to play the concatenation role for
different agents, each contingent on whatever operation is appropriate for that
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agent’s idiosyncratic belief ranking, then both interpersonal and intrapersonal
cardinal comparisons would become quite useless in general. Before we could
know what it means for Sally to believe p twice as much as q, we would first
have to take into account her entire belief ranking, work out what the concate-
nation operation is, and only then give empirical meaning to the comparison.
Without knowledge of the overall structure of her belief ranking, the cardinal
comparison would only tell us that
(i) Sally believes p more than q, and
(ii) There’s some binary operation ⊕ that shares certain formal properties
with addition relative to % such that for q′, q′′ somehow related to q,
q′ ⊕ q′′ = p
The latter is deeply uninformative, and the former we don’t need cardinal com-
parisons to express. Disjunctivism is a non-starter; for non-supplemented com-
parativists, it’s the GRP or bust.
5.4 Impossible Worlds
A final objection, this time relating to the assumption that Ω contains only
possible worlds (§3). Roughly, the worry is this. In §4.4, I argued that there
are quantifiable belief states that cannot be modelled by any Cr that agrees
with a belief ranking satisfying B2. But my argument for this assumes that Cr
is defined over a space of possible worlds. With an algebra defined on a rich
enough space of possible and impossible worlds, we can construct probability
functions that ‘mimic’ the behaviour of any non-probabilistic function on B.10
So, what looks like partial and comparative beliefs inconsistent with B2 when
we use only possible worlds can be re-modelled as a probability function, if we
help ourselves to enough impossible worlds.
This ‘re-modelling’ strategy also suggests that what seemed like very strong
rationality conditions, A1–A5, are in fact fully compatible with the belief rank-
ings of highly non-ideal agents. To generalise the comparativist explanation of
cardinality, we need not go beyond probability theory—we just need to have
enough impossible worlds. And the strategy may even help with Examples 1–5.
For this, it would have to be shown that for any sequence of ordinally equivalent
Cr on B whose members we want to distinguish, there are as many ordinally
non-equivalent probabilities defined over the space with impossible worlds to
‘mimic’ them. I suspect that this is false for finite B. But the point is moot,
because the ‘re-modelling’ strategy will not help comparativism. I’ll set out my
reasons for saying this very briefly, since the relevant issues are discussed at
length in (Elliott, forthcoming).
Once Ω includes enough impossible worlds for the strategy to work—roughly,
for any impossibility, there’s an impossible world that verifies it—most subsets
of Ω will be meaningless, not representative of any proper contents of thought.
More importantly, the set of meaningful subsets will have precisely zero inter-
esting set-theoretic structure. For any meaningful subset p of Ω, none of p’s
10 In (Elliott, forthcoming), I show that if B is a countable subset of ℘(Ω), where Ω is
a space of possible worlds, Ω+ is a rich enough extension of Ω (i.e., has enough impossible
worlds), and Cr is any function from B into [0, 1], then there’s a probability function Cr+ on
an appropriate algebra of sets B+ on Ω+ such that Cr+ assigns x to the subset of Ω+ that
verifies ϕ just in case Cr assigns x to the subset of Ω that verifies ϕ. For more details, see also
(Cozic 2006), (Halpern and Pucella 2011).
23
subsets or supersets will be meaningful, and no subset of Ω \ p will be mean-
ingful either. In short, having too many impossible worlds in Ω renders useless
useful set-theoretic definition of ‘concatenation’.
Of course, we don’t have to define ‘concatenations’ set-theoretically. But
the only other place we’ll find the requisite structure is in the logical relations
amongst the contents that the meaningful subsets of Ω+ represent. That is,
we could define ‘concatenations’ in terms of the disjunctions of inconsistent
contents. But doing things this way brings us right back to where we started
vis-a`-vis the generalisability issues associated with A1–A5 and B2.
As I argue in (Elliott, forthcoming), any algebra that’s minimally rich enough
to represent the contents of belief will contain only meaningful propositions just
when the relevant space of worlds is closed under a consequence relation that
is, for all intents and purposes, at least as strong as classical propositional logic.
Impossible worlds aren’t a magical solution to comparativism’s generalisability
worries. Quite the opposite.
6 Interpersonal Comparability
Over and above the need to accommodate intrapersonal comparisons, compar-
ativists should also be able to explain interpersonal comparisons of strength of
belief. (See Meacham and Weisberg 2011, pp. 659–60, for a discussion on why
interpersonal comparisons are theoretically important.) In his recent defence
of probabilistic comparativism, Stefa´nsson (2017) argues for the possibility of
interpersonal comparisons of belief as follows:
It is generally assumed that... subjective probabilities (which rep-
resent strengths of belief) are interpersonally comparable... The
crucial difference between desires and beliefs in this regard is the
widely held assumption that any two rational people believe equally
strongly whatever they fully believe (such as a tautology), and, sim-
ilarly, believe equally strongly whatever they believe least of all...
(pp. 81–2)
The argument proceeds: Suppose Ann’s and Bob’s comparative beliefs satisfy
A1–A5 and Continuity, so there are unique probability functions CrA and CrB
that agree with %A and %B respectively. Moreover (from Continuity), for every
non-minimal proposition p, p is the union of some finite collection of equiproba-
ble atomic propositions. Thus, according to GRP, for any p ∈ BA and q ∈ BB ,
there’s a fact of the matter as to how much less p and q are believed than the
maximal Ω. So,
... we might compare the degree to which Ann believes [p] with the
degree to which Bob believes [q], by comparing the distance between
[p] and the tautology according to Ann with the distance between
[q] and the tautology according to Bob.
Moreover,
The result of the above comparison is the same across different nu-
merical models of Ann’s and Bob’s comparative beliefs [i.e., positive
similarity transformations of CrA and CrB ]. That is, if Ann believes
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[p] more strongly than Bob believes [q] according to one of these
models, then the same holds according to all of these models. (p. 82)
The idea seems to be that because
(A) CrA and CrB are ratio-scale measures of Ann’s and Bob’s beliefs respec-
tively, and
(B) they both sit on the [0, 1] scale, with ∅ at 0 and Ω at 1,
we’re licensed in saying that CrA and CrB belong to the ‘same model’ of partial
belief. And because of this, we’re licensed in making comparisons between them.
If we applied some positive similarity transformation to, say, CrA but not CrB ,
the result would be an adequate ratio-scale measure of Ann’s beliefs, but it would
ruin the interpersonal comparisons. To ensure interpersonal comparability, we
just need to ensure that %A and %B belong to the ‘same model.’11
Much hangs on the assumption that the minima and maxima of %A and
%B are comparable across rational agents. It’s not clear to me how widely held
this really is outside of orthodox Bayesian circles, and it’s much less clear how
we could generalise the explanation to accommodate non-ideal agents. But set
those points aside, and assume that for every agent S,
1. %S satisfies A1–A5 and Continuity
2. Ω is believed to the fullest extent that S can believe anything, and ∅ to
the least extent
The real worry here is that we’ve been offered no real explanation of interper-
sonal comparability, even given these assumptions. Facts (A) and (B) above give
us no reason to think that CrA and CrB measure comparable quantities.
An analogy will help to make this clear. Imagine a universe ∆ that’s finite in
extent, and consists fundamentally of spherical atoms each with some non-zero
diameter and non-zero mass, with no occupiable spaces between them. The non-
atomic objects of this universe are the mereological sums of contiguous atoms.
Let O be set of all such objects in ∆. Included in O will be two special objects:
∅, the ‘empty’ arrangement of atoms; and ∆ itself. Assume that length is always
measured along some privileged axis such that every object has a unique length,
and let %l and %m denote the is at least as long as and is at least as massive
as relations respectively.
Obviously, %l and %m will be correlated in many respects, and they’ll share
a number of their properties. In fact, given the intuitively additive properties
of %l with respect to concatenations (§2) and precisely analogous properties for
%m , it’s possible to construct a pair of ratio-scale measures fl and fm of %l and
%m respectively, such that for all α, β ∈ O,
(il ) α %l β iff fl(α) ≥ fl(β)
(iil ) fl(∅) = 0 and fl(∆) = 1
(iiil ) If α, β share no parts, then
fl(α⊕ o2) = fl(α) + fl(β)
(i
m
) α %m β iff fm(α) ≥ fm(β)
(ii
m
) fm(∅) = 0 and fm(∆) = 1
(iii
m
) If α, β share no parts, then
fm(α⊕ o2) = fm(α) + fm(β)
11 In (Stefa´nsson 2017) this argument in terms of positive affine transformations. In his
(2018), though, Stefa´nsson switches to similarity transformations, as I’ve done here. This
won’t make a difference to my discussion.
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Indeed, fl will be unique, in the sense that no other function will satisfy (i
l )
through (iiil ); and likewise for fm, mutatis mutandis. It should go without saying
that none of this implies that lengths and masses are comparable, in the sense
that if fl(α) ≥ fm(β), then α has as at least as much length as β has mass.
Suppose we now stipulate that ∆ has as much length as it has mass. Maybe
then we could derive additional length-mass comparisons for arbitrary pairs of
objects; e.g., if fl(α) = 0.5, then α will have less length than ∆ has mass,
because α has less length than ∆ and ∆ has just as much length as it has
mass, so α must have less length than ∆ has mass. And furthermore, so long
as we stick to making sure length and mass are being measured on ‘the same
model,’ all such length-mass comparisons will remain unchanged. That is, if
fl(∅) = fm(∅), fl(∆) = fm(∆), and fl(α) ≥ fm(β), then those relations will
be preserved under any pair of functions f?l and f
?
m that we define by applying
the same positive similarity transformation to fl and fm respectively.
So we’ve learnt that if you stipulate that length and mass have comparable
maxima, then you’ll be able to construct a privileged set of pairs of functions
according to which lengths and masses can be compared more generally. But this
is entirely uninteresting: the stipulation is false, and the resulting comparisons
look deeply artificial. The fact that circumstances might conspire such that we
can measure the two loosely correlated quantities with functions that share a
lot of their formal properties does nothing to change the fact that length-mass
comparisons are meaningless. If they were meaningful, then there would be
some interesting scale-independent physical relation that holds between α and
β whenever α has at least as much length as β has mass. But since nothing
interesting in physics changes when we, say, hold the scale for length fixed while
varying the scale for mass, there’s no genuine basis for making such comparisons.
Likewise, to explain interpersonal comparisons of partial belief, we need an
interesting scale-independent relation that holds between Ann and Bob when
Ann believes p at least as much as Bob believes q. We won’t find any such relation
merely by looking at %A and %B—as we’ve seen, Ann and Bob could have
identical comparative beliefs yet distinct partial beliefs. Rather, we’ll likely find
the justification for interpersonal comparisons in the broader role that partial
beliefs play in the psychologies of the agents that have them. Once again, we
need to take preferences into account.
7 Non-Comparativism
It’s clear that we need a qualitative account of ‘where the numbers come from’.
There are no numbers in the head. But there are multiple approaches to ex-
plaining qualitatively how we can come to have numerically quantifiable partial
beliefs that don’t take us through comparative beliefs first. The so-called anti-
realist or interpretivist approaches—according to which partial beliefs are taken
to be mere tools for representing rational preferences—tend to receive the most
attention in philosophy. I suspect that much of the sympathy for comparativism
derives from a distaste for this kind of anti-realism, but there’s no reason that
non-comparativists should be committed to anything of the sort.
One alternative approach takes comparative expectations over random vari-
ables as basic, from which partial and comparative beliefs are derived simulta-
neously (see, e.g., Suppes and Zanotti 1976, Clark 2000). It’s well known that
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these approaches allow for distinctions between probability functions that com-
parativism cannot make, though as yet there’s been no serious work done on
the empirical plausibility of the view. Another possibility would be a ‘map-like’
approach to beliefs, under which neither comparative beliefs nor (individual)
partial beliefs are more fundamental, instead both being grounded in one or
more holistic representations of uncertainty (cf. Lewis 1982).12 Such an ap-
proach could be given realist credentials; for instance, according to probabilistic
population coding models, uncertainty can be represented by the activity of pop-
ulations of neurons that encode parameters of probability density distributions
over small sets of random variables (e.g., means and covariances). No specific
subset of the neuronal population represents an individual belief state; rather,
probability functions are represented by the population as a whole. (See Ma
et al. 2006, Pouget et al. 2013, for reviews.)
Once we start looking for qualitative structures that could ground our partial
beliefs, we see that there’s no shortage of possibilities to consider. I won’t try
to review them all. Instead, in the remainder of this section, I want to give a
rough sketch of a functionalist non-comparativism that I find attractive—one
that takes their role in the production of preferences seriously, and (arguably)
fits more naturally with how partial beliefs are ordinarily conceptualised.
A metaphor may be helpful to begin with. Imagine that inside Sally’s head,
perhaps in a little compartment labelled ‘partial beliefs’, is a collection of barrels.
While every barrel is the same size, each has a different marking. Perhaps the
markings are in a language we don’t recognise, or perhaps they aren’t language-
like at all—what matters is just that the markings can be used to identify each
barrel individually. Furthermore, inside each barrel is a certain amount of con-
fidence fluid. After poking around inside Sally’s head for a bit, we find that the
amount of fluid within the barrel labelled ‘Û’ correlates nicely with Sally having
preferences over actions and dispositions to choose across varying decision situ-
ations that we’d typically expect if she believed p to different degrees. (Or she
does so in normal circumstances: when not intoxicated, stressed, etc.)
In more detail, we find, for example, that when the barrel marked ‘Û’ is 100%
full, Sally generally has preferences we’d associate with being certain that p. But
when the barrel is only partially full, matters are a little more tricky: Sally’s
preferences in such circumstances often depend heavily on the state of the other
barrels in her ‘partial belief’ compartment, as well as some other barrels in a
separate compartment labelled ‘utilities’. Indeed, sometimes there can be quite
different ‘total barrel states’ that give rise to the exactly same preferences. As
such, there’s no simple one-one relationship between Sally’s preferences and her
‘total barrel state’. This complicates matters, but we have enough know-how to
also investigate what happens when we hold the amount of fluid in one barrel
fixed while varying the others. After extensive investigation, we find that:
1. Under all (or almost all) perturbations in the states of the other barrels,
whenever the barrel marked ‘Û’ is x% full, Sally’s preferences are consistent
with expectations were Sally to believe that p to degree x/100; and
12 So, for example, S believes p to degree x iff S is in one of a disjunction of map-like states
represented by a distribution Cr such that Cr(p) = x; and S believes p more than q iff she’s
in a map-like state represented by a Cr such that Cr(p) > Cr(q).
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2. For any other proposition q and degree y, under most perturbations where
the barrel marked ‘Û’ is x% full, the resulting preferences are inconsistent
with expectations were Sally to believe q to degree y
Like any good functionalist, we conclude that Sally believes p to degree x/100
when the barrel marked ‘Û’ is x% full. We apply a similar strategy to work
out what mental types the other barrels correspond to. This gives us access to
Sally’s partial beliefs, from which we derive her comparative beliefs.
On this picture, the strength of belief is a ratio-scale measure of relative
volume, and (crucially) attaches to each partial belief individually. Sally’s entire
set of partial beliefs can still be represented by a single function Cr : B 7→ [0, 1],
but that function is not itself a measure of anything—it merely summarises
the individual measurements of every p ∈ B. Still, Cr captures some interesting
cardinal relationships between partial beliefs. Because the barrels are the same
size, if Cr(p) = 2 · Cr(q), then we know there’s twice as much confidence fluid in
the barrel associated with Sally’s p-beliefs than the barrel associated with her
q-beliefs. Because Sally is mostly rational, if the (p∩q)-barrel is empty, then the
amount of fluid in the (p ∪ q)-barrel is usually more-or-less equal to the sum of
the volumes of the fluid in the p- and q-barrels. But this isn’t necessarily true,
and it’s no part of the explanation for why her partial beliefs are ratio-scale
measurable.
There are three key elements to the metaphor:
(i) Partial belief state-types are in principle identifiable independently of their
causal roles (and likewise for utilities),
(ii) The actual and potential causal roles of these state-types in normal cir-
cumstances are sufficiently rich to allow them to be distinguished, and
(iii) Given these facts, we can understand the cardinality and comparability of
partial beliefs by reference to their role in the production of preferences
There’s much to be said about (i) and (ii), and justifying either is no easy matter.
If necessary, we can make (ii) more plausible by expanding the causal role to
include not only ‘forward-looking’ roles (i.e., in the production of preferences),
but also ‘backward-looking’ roles (i.e., responses to evidence). But spot me those
two claims for the sake of argument. The important issue for present purposes
is how to cash out (iii). Roughly, the question is: what is it for ‘barrel’ to be x%
filled with confidence fluid, and why think that any one barrel’s being x% full
should be comparable to any other barrel’s being x% full?
Once again, Ramsey—albeit in a different mood than we last encountered
him—serves as inspiration:
[...] the degree of a belief is a causal property of it, which we can
express vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it.
(1931, p. 169)
Or to put it another way: the strength of a belief that p is a measure of its
influence on preferences over gambles conditional on p under normal conditions.
This is easiest to see when considering simple binary gambles of the kind that
Ramsey focused on, though of course we could easily extend the point to a richer
space of gambles represented in the style of, e.g., Savage (1954).
Suppose we’ve got a fix on Sally’s utilities, which we represent using a utility
function U defined over a rich space of outcomes, where U sits on (at least) an
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interval scale. Given this, I’ll make two assumptions about ordinary agents.
First, if Cr represents Sally’s partial beliefs, then Cr(p) = 1 − Cr(p), and that
when Sally is faced with a pair of gambles,
〈o1 if p1, o2 otherwise〉, 〈o3 if p2, o4 otherwise〉,
then she weakly prefers the former to the latter iff
Cr(p1) · U(o1 ∩ p1) + Cr(p1) · U(o2 ∩ p1) ≥
Cr(p2) · U(o3 ∩ p2) + Cr(p2) · U(o4 ∩ p2)
So suppose that Sally is given a choice between
g1 = 〈o1 if p, o1 otherwise〉, g2 = 〈o2 if p, o2 otherwise〉,
g3 = 〈o3 if p, o3 otherwise〉, g4 = 〈o1 if p, o2 otherwise〉,
where, for simplicity, we assume that U(o1) = U(o1∩p) = U(o1∩p), and similarly
for o2, o3. In other words, Sally is given a choice between a gamble conditional
on p for either o1 or o2, and three ‘trivial’ gambles worth exactly as much as o2,
o2, and o3 respectively. She’d prefer g1 to g4, and g4 to g2. We’d expect exactly
this if Sally preferred o1 to o2, and were somewhat uncertain as to whether p.
But by how much does she prefer g4 to g2? Well, she’s indifferent between
g3 and g4, so
Cr(p) · U(o1) + (1− Cr(p)) · U(o2) = U(o3)
Given this, we can quantify the ‘effect’ that her uncertainty regarding p has had
on her preferences regarding g4 by considering where o3 sits in the utility scale
between o1 and o2. More perspicuously, and rearranging the above, we get the
standard betting ratios equation:
Cr(p) = U(o3)− U(o2)U(o1)− U(o2)
So, if Sally believes p to degree, say, 0.75, then the utility she associates with
the gamble g3 will sit 75% of the way between the utilities of o1 and o2.
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There are three important points to note about the foregoing. First, the ac-
count doesn’t commit us to saying that Sally’s partial beliefs supervene on her
preferences—nor, worse, that they are nothing over and above her preferences.
Sally could, for example, be indifferent between all possible outcomes (cf. Eriks-
son and Ha´jek 2007’s ‘Zen monk’ example), in which case she’d have the same
preferences regardless of what her partial beliefs looked like. But that merely in-
dicates that the role of beliefs in generating actual preferences are sometimes not
enough to distinguish between them; it’s no reason to think that their causal po-
tential in counterfactual situations be likewise insufficient. Similarly, there may
be agents whose partial beliefs are so far from being probabilistically coherent
that their preferences over gambles don’t fit the nice patterns we usually expect.
For instance, in Descartes’ case (Example 4), Cr†(p) 6≈ 1− Cr†(p), so his belief
that p won’t have its usual effects on preferences as represented in the betting
ratios equation. But the strength of a belief is only supposed to be indicative
13 As demonstrated in Elliott (2017a,b), nothing in the above requires that Cr be a proba-
bility function—in fact, it can be highly incoherent. We did assume that Cr(p) = 1− Cr(¬p)
(under normal conditions), which is a far cry from full probabilistic coherence.
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of its normal causal role—that causal role does not have to be manifest in all
cases (cf. Lewis 1980). And it’s perfectly reasonable to think that, in most cases,
Cr(p) = 1− Cr(p), at least to a near approximation.
Second, while U need not be any stronger than an interval scale, the charac-
terisation we’ve given of partial beliefs will represent them on a full ratio scale:
ratios of differences of utilities will remain unchanged under any positive affine
transformation of U . We don’t have to assume that utilities are comparable
across individuals in order to explain interpersonal comparability of belief—to
explain both intrapersonal and interpersonal belief comparisons, we just need to
assume that (a) utilities are measurable on an interval scale, and (b) strengths
of belief influence preferences over gambles in a similar sort of way within and
across ordinary individuals. From that, we get that if A and B both believe
p to degree x, then their preferences will display similar patterns with respect
to gambles conditional on p. Conversely, in cases like Jack and Jill’s (§4.2), we
know that Jack believes a2 more than Jill does precisely because their preferences
come apart with respect to matters involving a2.
And finally, the account is continuous with the characterisation of other
quantities found throughout the sciences. In particular, the pattern applied here,
of characterising one quantity in terms of its interaction with other quantities,
is familiar from the definition of various dimensionless quantities—e.g., refrac-
tive index, relative permeability, and Mach number. Consider Mach numbers.
Contrary to common opinion, a Mach number is not a unit of speed: it is a ratio
that represents the speed of an object travelling through a medium relative to
the speed of sound in that medium. Or, if we let S be any measure of speed on
at least an interval scale, let ostationary denote a stationary object and osound an
object travelling at the speed of sound in the medium, then the Mach number
of an object o1 can be defined as:
Mach(o1) =
S(o1)− S(ostationary)
S(osound)− S(ostationary)
Interestingly, the language with which we attribute partial beliefs also fits
the pattern of dimensionless quantity attributions. To avoid ambiguity, attri-
butions of dimensional quantities like length, mass, and temperature require
specification of a unit. For instance, in most contexts we need to say ‘o1 has
a length of 10 meters and weighs 10kg’. But because dimensionless quantities
have no special units (ratios of differences are absolute) we say, e.g., ‘water has
a refractive index of 1.33’, or ‘wood has a relative permeability of 1.0’. Likewise:
‘Sally believes p to degree x’—not ‘Sally believes p with x credals’, as one might
expect if the strength of belief were a dimensional quantity like length.
8 Conclusion
Of course, the kind of functionalism I’ve just sketched faces its own challenges,
as do the other non-comparativist approaches I noted. We shouldn’t invest an
extreme amount of confidence in any of them. But they do highlight alternative
avenues for a fully qualitative, non-comparativist, and realist account of ‘where
the numbers come from’. And they no doubt only scratch the surface. Any
suggestion that we need comparativism to explain the measurement of belief is
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plainly false, and given comparativism’s many limitations, we have every reason
to look elsewhere for an account of the fundamental doxastic state.14
9 Appendix
Theorem 1
Existence, left-to-right : (i) Assume B2. If p is n/m-valued and n′/m′-valued, then
n/m = n′/m′; so we’re able to assign a unique r ∈ [0, 1] to every p ∈ N and
thus define a Ramsey function Cr relative to % on N. Cr can then obviously be
extended to B. (ii) Suppose for p, q ∈ N, p % q. Where p is n/m-valued and q is
n′/m′-valued, n/m ≥ n′/m′. By (i), Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q). Next suppose Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q).
Since Cr is a Ramsey function, p is n/m-valued and q is n′/m′-valued, for n/m ≥
n′/m′. So from B2, p % q. Existence, right-to-left is straightforward and omitted.
Uniqueness: The left-to-right is obvious. The restriction of Cr to N is the
unique Ramsey function relative to the restriction of % to N; so if N = B then
Cr is unique simpliciter.
Theorem 2
Existence, left-to-right : Assume B2, B3, B is countable. We focus on the case
where N ⊂ B as B1 trivialises the proof. From B3, at least one nonempty set
G of functions Cr : B 7→ R agrees with %—see (Dubra et al. 2004, p. 556). We
need that there’s a nonempty G∗ ⊆ G s.t.
1. G∗ agrees with %
2. ∀Cr ∈ G∗, there’s a strictly increasing transformation Cr′ of Cr s.t.
(a) Cr′ is bounded by 1 and 0
(b) Cr′ is a Ramsey function w.r.t. %
The set F of all such transformations will agree with %, completing the proof.
There are three cases:
1. N is empty
2. N contains only the minimal and/or maximal elements of B
3. N contains non-minimal, non-maximal elements of B
The first two are straightforward and omitted. For the third, if G agrees with
%, and p  q, then:
(i) Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q), for all Cr ∈ G
(ii) Cr(p) > Cr(q), for some Cr ∈ G
So for any Cr ∈ G, if p  q then Cr(p) > Cr(q) or Cr(p) = Cr(q). For p, q ∈ N,
B2 implies that for any Ramsey function, if p  q, then Cr(p) > Cr(q); so,
it’s not in general true that if G agrees with %, then for every Cr ∈ G there’s
14 Many thanks are due to John Cusbert, Nick DiBella, Daniel Elstein, Alan Ha´jek, Jessica
Isserow, Jim Joyce, Le´a Salje, and Jack Woods for helpful discussions and comments on
drafts. Thanks are also due to audiences at the Australian National University, the University
of Leeds, the 2018 Formal Epistemology Workshop, the 4th PLM conference (Bochum, 09/
17), and the 3rd ICM conference (Braga, 10/17). This project has received funding from
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie
Sk lodowska-Curie grant agreement No 703959.
31
a strictly increasing transformation of Cr that’s also a Ramsey function with
respect to %. But define G∗ ⊆ G as follows:
G? = {Cr ∈ G : if p, q ∈ N and p  q, then Cr(p) > Cr(q)}
G? agrees with %, and by (ii) above, we know that it’s nonempty. Let GR
denote the set of restrictions of every Cr ∈ G? to N, now the unique Ramsey
function CrR on N is a strictly increasing transformation of every Cr ∈ GR. So
we just have to show that each Cr ∈ G? has a strictly increasing transformation
that’s there’s an extension of CrR from N to B. Where B is countable this is
straightforward, given that for every Cr ∈ G?, Cr(p) is rational.
Theorem 3
Suppose % violates B2 and Cr agrees with %. So there exist p, q s.t. p is n/m-
valued, q is n′/m′-valued, and not: (p % q) ↔ (n/m ≥ n′/m′). There are three
cases:
1. Neither p nor q is minimal
2. Both p and q are minimal
3. Exactly one of p or q is minimal
Start with case 1. Focus on p, and let max designate some maximal proposition.
(If p is n/m-valued, non-minimal, then max exists.) p is either:
(i) The union of n members of an m-scale of max , or
(ii) The union of n′′ members of an m′′-scale of ... the union of n′′′ members
of an m′′′-scale of max
If (i), Cr coheres with the GRP only if Cr(p) = n/m·Cr(r); if (ii), only if Cr(p) =
(n′′·...·n′′′)/(m′′·...·m′′′)·Cr(r), where (n′·...·n′′)/(m′·...·m′′) = n/m. The same applies
to q, mutatis mutandis, so Cr coheres with the GRP only if Cr(p) = n′/m′·Cr(r).
Assume for reductio that Cr coheres with the GRP. Now suppose n/m ≥ n′/m′,
so Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q), and hence p % q. In the other direction, suppose p % q; so
Cr(p) ≥ Cr(q), and n/m ≥ n′/m′. So, p % q ↔ n/m ≥ n′/m′, which violates our
assumptions.
Case 2. Assume there are p, q ∈ B such that p  q, and that if p is minimal,
then Cr(p) = 0. If p, q are minimal then p ∼ q, and if Cr agrees with % then
Cr(p) = Cr(q) > Cr(s), for any s such that s 6∼ p (and hence s  p). Since p, q
are 0/m-valued by definition, B2 is violated only if p or q is also n/m-valued, for
n > 0. Suppose this of p; then by the earlier reasoning, Cr coheres with the
GRP only if Cr(p) = n/m · Cr(r). Since n/m > 0 and Cr(r) > 0, this is false; so
Cr conflicts with the GRP.
Case 3 is then straightforward, and the proof of the corollary (for sets of
functions) follows the same structure. Both are omitted.
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